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Abstract1
We develop 200 contrarian trading strategies based on significant market variations to
test whether it is possible to benefit from the well-known psychological bias of overreaction2
that plagues investors. We conduct the most recent and appropriate statistical tests to3
ensure that none of these active strategies beats the buy-and-hold strategy due to pure4
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1 Introduction1
Investors have always scouted throughout the globe to find the highest returns on their invest-2
ment. Since the 1980’s, this long-lasting quest for the Holy Grail has nevertheless been taking3
place in a constantly moving environment, accompanied by the rise and fall of new trading4
venues, participants, instruments, and technologies. In such market conditions, market varia-5
tions can be extreme and even caused by exceptional events, the Black Monday (on October6
19, 1987) and the Flash Crash (on May 6, 2010) being two notable examples. Not surprisingly,7
extreme explanations have also been proposed, from purely ‘rational’ computer-based trading8
to purely ‘irrational’ human behavior. It is nevertheless undisputable that investor psychology9
bears on the determination of market prices. On December 5, 1996, even Alan Greenspan who10
was a fierce advocate of the free market used the term ‘irrational exuberance’ to characterise11
the behavior of investors. Interestingly enough, markets kept rising until the middle of the12
year 2000. A more recent example concerns the European debt crisis when Mario Draghi,13
President of the European Central Bank (ECB), asserted on July 26, 2012 that the ECB was14
ready to do ‘whatever it takes’ to preserve the Euro. Following the speech, the mood turned15
upbeat as European stock exchanges started to rise, with the French CAC and the Spanish16
IBEX indexes closing 4.07% and 6.06% higher respectively. These two short examples remind17
us of the role that psychology plays in trading and investment decisions.18
Applied psychology has considerably affected the way finance research is nowadays con-
ducted. In behavioral finance, a particular attention is given to the degree of investor irra-19
tionality through the study of the effects of social, cognitive and emotional factors on market20
prices, returns and asset allocation. Market inefficiencies and anomalies are viewed as evidence21
of under- or over-reactions to information, leading to extended market trends or abrupt mar-22
ket reversals. Such market imperfections are attributed to a combination of cognitive biases23
such as bounded rationality, overconfidence, overreaction, representative bias, mimicry (herd-24
ing instinct), and other predictable human errors in reasoning and information processing. Its25
increasing importance has been acknowledged by the 2002 and 2013 Sveriges Riksbank Prize26
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, that has been attributed respectively to27
Daniel Kahneman and Robert Shiller.28
We contribute to the literature on behavioral finance by investigating whether the well-
known psychological bias of overreaction that plagues investors is predictable enough to lead to29
abnormal profits, justifying the claim that investor’s behavior can be modeled appropriately.30
In particular, we test the predictive power of reversal signals based on significant market31
1
variations and control for transaction costs, borrowing costs, and randomness. The basic1
assumption is that investor overreaction drives excessive market movements that ultimately2
lead to price reversals. Under the null hypothesis (of no predictability), such reversal pattern3
cannot be anticipated and no abnormal profit can be realized. To the best of our knowledge,4
no previous work has studied overreaction-based strategies in the way we attempt to test them,5
using robust statistical procedures. To test the hypothesis of no predictability, we apply the6
Superior Predictive Ability (SPA) test and its stepwise version (SSPA), which corrects for7
data snooping. As in Duvinage et al. (2013), a double-or-out approach for trading strategies8
is used, which consists in following a benchmark by holding a long position modulated by one9
buy or sell transaction depending upon the previous day’s price movement. This approach10
is recommended for SSPA tests since it delivers the same number of observations for each11
simulation.12
The aim of the present paper is to test a comprehensive set of trading strategies based on
both buy and sell signals. We do not address the differences between buy and sells signals,13
although some recent research evidence, such as Cooper et al. (2004) and Huang (2006),14
suggests that momentum profits depend on the up or down state of the market. We rather aim15
at testing trading strategies as a whole, correcting for data-snooping bias. Our results suggest16
that after controlling for transaction costs, borrowing costs, and data snooping (i.e. luck),17
active strategies based on investor overreaction do not provide significantly higher returns18
than the buy-and-hold benchmark strategy. Although evidence of significance is found in19
some cases, it remains too weak to be generalized.20
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review some key findings
of the literature on behavioral finance related to overreaction. Section 3 describes the method-21
ology. In Section 4, we provide a brief description of the dataset and report the empirical22
results. The final section concludes.23
2 Literature Review24
Uncertainty plays a key role when it comes to making financial decisions. In the traditional25
finance literature, investors are able to make the best choice among all the possible alternatives26
by perfectly identifying the consequences associated with each of them. However, Simon (1955,27
1957, 1959, 1979) argue that investors do not behave in a fully rational way. They have bounded28
rationality instead, i.e. they are limited in their capacity to process information. When making29
2
decisions, investors are argued to rely on a limited number of simplifying rules, failing to1
integrate the full logic of their decisions. For instance, when people have to choose between2
many possibilities, they just eliminate alternatives that do not present some predetermined3
characteristics, instead of thoroughly examining each alternative with its associated strengths4
and weaknesses (see Hong et al., 2005). Kahneman (1973) also argues that people are limited5
in their ability to perform several tasks at the same time. Miller (1956) further assesses that6
people can process only seven pieces of information simultaneously, implying that the cognitive7
load required for complex decisions overtakes their cognitive capabilities. For instance, the8
management of an investment portfolio is not an easy task since investors should not only put9
their attention on individual assets but also on the interactions between them.10
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) argue that investors11
consider each decision in turn, instead of adopting a broader perspective. This decision process12
is called mental accounting. For instance, the decision to buy the stock of a company is13
separated from the decision on the amount of money to invest, thereby rejecting the influence14
between the two decisions. As outlined by Read and Rabin (1999), decision taking is impacted15
by the mental ‘bracketing’ of decisions, i.e. the fact that each decision is evaluated sequentially16
rather than in the global environment of all the decisions to make.17
Such a ‘narrow bracketing’ depends on cognitive inertia. As outlined by Slovic (1972),
the way decision problems are introduced (i.e. sequentially versus simultaneously or directly18
versus revealed after the cognitive process) bears on the investor choice. For instance, when19
people have to choose among several items, they choose more items when these choices are20
presented to them simultaneously rather than sequentially, as indicated by Redelmeier and21
Tversky (1992), Read and Rabin (1999) as well as Kahneman (2003).22
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) document the fact that people often reduce the complex
tasks of forming expectations and assessing probabilities to simpler judgmental operations.23
They identify a heuristic that is employed by people when they make decisions under uncer-24
tainty, called the ‘representativeness heuristic’. When people evaluate the probability of an25
uncertain event belonging to a particular population, they often make probability judgments26
using similarities. In other words, when an event (e.g. a good performing stock) is highly27
representative of another class of events (i.e. a well-regarded company), the probability that28
the first originates from the second is judged to be (too) high (and vice versa). Kahneman and29
Tversky (1972, 1973) also suggest that too much weight is given to recent evidence, resulting30
in unrealistic forecasts. Barberis et al. (1998) also indicate that agents mistakenly extrapolate31
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expectations from patterns in small samples. Barberis et al. (1998) show that this ‘misconcep-1
tion of chance’ bias leads investors to expect: higher (lower) returns after the release of good2
(bad) earnings announcements; and higher (lower) returns for recent winners (losers), while3
overreacting to prices over longer periods of time.4
Investors also suffer from overconfidence and self-attribution, as outlined by Daniel et al.
(1998, 2001). Overconfidence arises when investors think that they can predict the future5
better than they actually can, and are excessively optimistic about it. Self-attribution refers6
to the systematic attribution of success to skills, on the one hand, and failures to bad luck, on7
the other hand. Weinstein (1980) also suggests that most people have unrealistic views of their8
abilities, thereby engaging in wishful thinking. Daniel et al. (1998) and Barberis and Shleifer9
(2003) indicate that self-attribution maintains overconfidence. Odean (1999) also documents10
how overconfidence results in excessive trading. More recently, Barber and Odean (2008) show11
that investors tend to buy stocks that: appear in the press; exhibit high abnormal trading12
volumes; or display abnormally high returns.13
Contrarian trading strategies have been widely analyzed in the literature over the last two
decades. Yet, there is still no clear consensus on whether contrarian trading strategies are14
profitable once the luck effect has been removed, or whether the associated risk is the main15
cause of the excess returns. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) are the first to clearly lift the veil on16
market overreaction but it is Chan (1988) who provides a first comprehensive overview of what17
exactly implies a contrarian investment strategy. He suggests that the higher returns obtained18
by contrarians are a logical compensation for the higher risk they take by picking losers. He19
also finds no evidence that supports the overreaction hypothesis. Through the testing of return20
autocorrelations, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) provide evidence against overreaction being the21
only reason why contrarians make profits. However, Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that the22
use of contrarian strategies can help beat the market: these strategies yield significantly higher23
returns even when risk is taken into account. Then, Dechow and Sloan (1997) argue against24
Lakonishok et al. (1994)’s findings, showing that biased forecasts and naive expectations are the25
key return drivers of contrarian trading strategies. The more recent release of David Dreman’s26
book Contrarian Trading Strategies: The Pyschological Edge has led to new contributions,27
including Loughran (2012) who clearly argues in favor of contrarian trading strategies, as in28
the book.29
All the behavioral biases identified in this section tend to move stock prices away from
their economic fundamentals. Although the continuous adjustment of prices may be due to30
4
news arrivals and coherent with the efficient market hypothesis, it is also undeniable that some1
large unexplained fluctuations occur from time to time. Is it possible for contrarian investors2
to design profitable trading strategies based on these significant market variations? To answer3
this question, we test 200 contrarian strategies which are described in the next section.4
3 Methodology5
When significant market fluctuations occur, contrarian investors believe in the existence of6
irrational movements which are likely to be reversed by generating adaptation responses from7
market participants. The trading strategies that we test in this study are related to the8
overreaction bias which lies at the core of the literature on behavioral finance. These strategies9
are based on medium-term market timing: we buy (sell) at the close of very negative (positive)10
days and assume that large variations are relevant signals of medium-term market reversals.11
In the empirical analysis, we not only include periods of bubbles and crashes, but we also12
consider every market opening day as an opportunity to trade on unexpected and significant13
price variations.14
The basic principle behind the tested strategies is straightforward: after a large market
rise/drop, we bet on overreaction by investors and expect a price reversal movement. First, we15
consider various daily market drops/rises, from ± 1% to ± 10% as buy/sell signals. Second,16
we use a 5-year rolling window to compute percentile values. For instance, a buy signal is17
generated each time the last observed return is lower than the first percentile of the historical18
distribution built out of the previous five years of data. A sell signal is generated every time19
the last observed return exceeds the 99th percentile computed over the previous five years.20
The 5-year time window rolls each day to include the most recent return in the distribution.21
3.1 Data Snooping22
Finance research has provided various statistical tools to test the profitability of trading rules.23
Using a bootstrap methodology, Brock et al. (1992) find that moving averages and trading-24
range breaks generate statistically significant abnormal returns compared to four benchmark25
models. The bootstrap resamples the original series n times in a systematic and random man-26
ner, thereby allowing to study the properties of the estimators. To some degree, this method27
controls for randomness by adjusting the p-values that were biased. Sullivan et al. (1999) go28
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beyond Brock et al. (1992) by using White (2000)’s Reality Check bootstrap methodology1
which better controls for data snooping. When thousands of researchers and practitioners test2
thousands of trading strategies on the same time series, the null hypothesis of no abnormal3
profit is indeed very likely to be rejected at a given level of confidence because of pure luck4
only. Basic procedures of statistical hypothesis testing on single time series could therefore5
lead to wrong statistical decisions, e.g. committing a type-I error by rejecting the null hypoth-6
esis while it is true. If no correction for data mining is introduced, trading strategies cannot7
be tested seriously. As outlined by Hansen (2005), White (2000)’s Reality Check neverthe-8
less suffers from two drawbacks. First, the RC test can be manipulated by the inclusion of9
poor and irrelevant strategies in the set of alternative strategies. Second, the RC test checks10
whether there is any model for which the null is rejected but it does not identify the out-11
performing model(s). Hansen (2005) and Hsu et al. (2010) provide new tools to circumvent12
these two drawbacks by developing the Superior Predictive Ability (SPA) test and its stepwise13
extension, respectively. These methods improve White (2000)’s Reality Check by comparing14
the performance of a benchmark model to n alternative models while adjusting explicitly for15
data-snooping.116
3.2 Double-or-Out17
One of the requirements of the SPA test is the identical number of observations for each18
strategy, as indicated by Hansen (2005). In order to apply the SPA test and its stepwise19
extension, the double-or-out approach is considered (Duvinage et al., 2013). This method of20
investing starts by tracking the underlying asset (position +1). If there is no buy or sell signal21
(case 1), nothing more happens and we keep following the benchmark (position +1). If there22
is a large negative variation however (case 2), a buy signal is sent. We borrow money to double23
the position at the close of the day (position +2). We then wait for a large positive variation24
to close the whole position (going from position +2 to position 0).2 If there is a large positive25
variation (case 3), we sell the long position in the underlying asset and get the cash back (going26
from position +1 to position 0). Consequently, the ‘double-or-out’ approach implies that the27
position is always 0, +1 or +2.328
1The interested reader should refer to Brock et al. (1992), Sullivan et al. (1999), White (2000), Hansen
(2005), Hsu et al. (2010) and Duvinage et al. (2013) for additional technical information on these methods.
2In Section 4, we allow for the automatic return to the passive position (+1) after five days if no new signal
is sent.
3Another alternative is to start by taking a short position in the benchmark asset. In this case, the position
is 0, -1, or -2.
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3.3 Signals1
The computation of the buy and sell signals is done in two different ways. First, we use a2
predetermined percentage of daily price variation (from ±1% to ±10%). Second, we use the3
percentile function and a rolling window in order to add the most recent variation. We apply4
10 different percentiles, from 0.1 to 0.0001 and from and 0.99 to 0.9999. For instance, if today’s5
daily return is below (above) the return corresponding to the first (99th) percentile based on6
the 5 previous years, we have a buy (sell) signal. The next day, the time window rolls forward7
to integrate the latest observation.8
3.4 Cash Management9
We also test two different philosophies regarding cash management: the ‘full’ and ‘empty’10
approaches. Under the fist method, we assume that contrarian investors have sufficient cash,11
i.e. investors’ pockets are ‘full’ of cash. When a position is closed, investors are always able12
to pay back even if they receive less money than the amount they initially invested. Under13
the second method, contrarian investors have no cash, i.e. investors’ pockets are ’empty’. If14
investors have too little money to pay back the full amount of borrowing, they must generate15
cash out of the passive benchmark. In the event of a further market rise, they will not fully16
benefit from such a rise. In both cases, when there is more cash than required to pay back the17
borrowing, the cash surplus is reinvested.18
3.5 Costs19
We take both transaction and borrowing costs into account. At every step of the double-or-20
out system, we fully integrate transaction costs, i.e. 0.05% fees per transaction (e.g. Olson,21
2004). Borrowing costs are also crucial in the performance of trading strategies and are often22
not included in research studies. To integrate them, we use the 3-month LIBOR with an23
additional 1% broker’s call.24
3.6 Strategy Classification25
We also introduce stop loss orders. If the asset price at the end of the day is equal to (or lower26
than) the stop loss limit price, the position is closed in order to avoid excessive loss. Such27
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stop loss orders are widely used by practitioners in order to minimize the impact of human1
psychology and emotions on trading decisions. We follow the well-known principle:“Cut the2
losses short and let the profits run”. Finally, we make two different assumptions regarding the3
number of periods during which the contrarian investors remain fully invested in cash. Table4
1 shows the different combinations of the tested strategies with respect to the stop loss and5
the cash-holding period.6
Table 1: Stop loss and cash-holding period combinations
Features Description
Combination 1: No stop loss, 1. In position +2, there is no stop loss order.
No waiting 2. In position 0, we do not have to wait for the next buy signal to come back
to position + 1. After a sell transaction and five days spent in position 0, we
automatically come back to the benchmark tracking position ( position +1).
Combination 2: No stop loss, 1. In position +2, there is no stop loss order.
Waiting 2. In position 0, we have to wait for the next buy signal to come back to position + 1.
Combination 3: Stop loss, 1. In position +2, we use a stop loss of -2% (and -10%, alternatively).
No waiting 2. In position 0, we do not have to wait for the next buy signal to come back.
to position + 1. After a sell transaction and five days spent in position 0, we
automatically come back to the benchmark tracking position ( position +1).
Combination 4: Stop loss, 1. In position +2, we use a stop loss of -2% (and -10%, alternatively).
Waiting 2. In position 0, we have to wait for the next buy signal to come back to position + 1.
The 200 tested strategies are classified in Table 2. There are 120 strategies with an arbitrary
choice for the signals and 80 strategies based on rolling percentiles.7
Table 2: Classification of all the strategies
Signals Arbitrary Rolling window
Cash management Full Empty Full Empty
Combination n° 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Number 10 10 20 20 10 10 20 20 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Total 10 20 40 60 70 80 100 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
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4 Empirical analysis1
Although research studies typically focus on one single asset class, we consider two different2
ones: Indexes and exchange rates. Table 3 presents the different assets that we examine, as3
well as the length of the daily historical series. For each asset, we include the same number4
of observations. 6301 daily returns correspond to a 20-year period, while 3774 records cover a5
10-year period.6
We apply Hansen (2005)’s SPA methodology and Hsu et al. (2010)’s stepwise extension to
correct for data-snooping bias. The buy-and-hold strategy is compared to 200 active strategies.7
When testing for SPA, the question of interest is whether any alternative strategy performs8
better than the benchmark. The null hypothesis is that ‘the benchmark is not inferior to any9
alternative model’. If the null is rejected, we identify the outperforming strategies through the10
Stepwise SPA procedure. We test this hypothesis with and without transaction costs. This11
will help detect whether significant results are due to the strategies themselves or to costs only.12
Table 4 presents the lower and upper p-values associated with the SPA tests for each
security. The p-value of a SPA test shows the relative performance of the benchmark strategy13
with respect to the k alternative models (i.e. the 200 active strategies). A low (high) p-14
value indicates that the null hypothesis is (not) rejected: Superior alternative strategies to the15
benchmark do (not) exist. Considering a significance level at α%, a strategy has a statistically16
significant predictive power if its associated p-value is lower than α%. Finally, Hansen (2005)17
proposes lower and upper p-value estimations because there is no perfect estimation of the18
mean distribution. Using the upper p-value leads to more conservative conclusions in the19
sense that it minimizes the risk of rejecting the null hypothesis while it is actually true.20
9
Table 3: Dataset
Asset Country Period N
Panel A : Indexes
S&P 500 United-States 08/07/1987 - 06/07/2012 6301
FTSE 100 England 28/07/1987 - 06/07/2012 6301
DAX 30 Germany 25/08/1987 - 06/07/2012 6301
EURO STOXX 50 Europe 22/01/1988 - 06/07/2012 6301
HANG SENG 50 Hong-Kong 14/01/1987 - 06/07/2012 6301
IBOVESPA 50 Brazil 15/04/1997 - 06/07/2012 3774
MICEX 50 Russia 22/09/1996 - 06/07/2012 3774
BSE SENSEX 30 India 19/05/1997 - 06/07/2012 3774
SSE Comp 50 China 27/11/1996 - 06/07/2012 3774
NIKKEI 225 Japan 05/11/1986 - 06/07/2012 6301
Panel B : Exchange rates
EUR/USD Europe/U.S. 31/11/1999 - 06/07/2012 3268
EUR/JPY Europe/Japan 07/12/1999 - 06/07/2012 3268
USD/JPY U.S./Japan 07/03/1988 - 06/07/2012 6301
Source: Datastream.
Excluding transaction costs, the p-value is lower than 0.05 for the FTSE, EURO STOXX,
and NIKKEI indexes. These results suggest that there is at least one of the 200 active strategies1
that beat the passive strategy in more than 95 cases out of 100. On the exchange rate2
markets, p-values are all higher than 10%, pointing to a very poor predictive power and a3
greater efficiency. Although emerging markets are often considered as less efficient, there is4
no evidence that contrarian strategies lead to abnormal profits. Regarding the influence of5
transaction costs, p-values are logically smaller and several results become insignificant.6
The main drawback of the SPA test lies in the fact that it fails to identify the outperforming
active strategie(s). This identification task is done by carrying out the SSPA test. Results7
before transaction costs are reported in Table 5.8
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Table 4: SPA results
Without costs With costs
Asset Upper p-value Lower p-value Upper p-value Lower p-value
Panel A : Indexes
S&P 500 0.236 0.229 0.499 0.461
FTSE 100 0.045∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.192 0.156
DAX 30 0.074∗ 0.053∗ 0.132 0.092∗
EURO STOXX 50 0.023∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.056∗
NIKKEI 225 0.026∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.036∗∗
HANG SENG 0.266 0.161 0.421 0.235
IBOVESPA 0.155 0.116 0.241 0.173
SSE COMP 0.323 0.206 0.361 0.225
BSE SENSEX 0.666 0.435 0.692 0.462
MICEX 0.544 0.37 0.598 0.398
Panel B : Exchange Rates
EUR/USD 0.73 0.673 0.99 0.942
EUR/JPY 0.392 0.354 0.569 0.427
USD/JPY 0.308 0.257 0.682 0.479
Panel A, B, and C refer to indexes and exchange rates, respectively. The stars denote significance: ∗ denotes significance
at 10% while ∗∗ indicates significance at 5%.
Table 5: SSPA test : Significant strategies without costs
Asset Significance Strategies
FTSE 100 5% 133
FTSE 100 10% 133
DAX 30 5% None
DAX 30 10% 3, 103, 13, 43 and 23
EURO STOXX 50 5% 125 and 175
EURO STOXX 50 10% 125, 175, 126 and 124
NIKKEI 225 5% 53 and 13
NIKKEI 225 10% 53, 13, 43 and 103
This tables identifies the outperforming strategies for each underlying asset, that were significant in the SPA test. The
numbers refer to the strategies presented in Table 2.
We only have 5 significant strategies at the 5% significance level (strategies 13, 53, 125, 133,
11
and 175). There are 6 more strategies outperforming the benchmark at the a 10% significance1
level. Only three active strategies (i.e. 13, 43, and 103) lead to abnormal profits (before costs)2
on two different markets (i.e. DAX and NIKKEI).3
When costs and luck are correctly discounted, the overall empirical results show that
contrarian investors are very unlikely to generate abnormal profits above those provided by a4
passive buy-and-hold strategy5
5 Conclusion6
Although the efficient market hypothesis is widely regarded as a cornerstone of modern finance,7
the search for market-beating returns is still very much alive.4 This quest for the Holy Grail8
in finance often consists in designing active strategies with the goal of taking advantage of9
behavioral biases such as bounded rationality, self-attribution, overconfidence, or overreaction.10
The main purpose of this study is to test whether a contrarian investor who is fully aware
of these behavioral biases is able to ‘beat the market’. We therefore investigate the predictive11
power of reversal signals based on significant market variations and control for transaction12
costs, borrowing costs, and randomness. For instance, overselling a stock moves the market13
price away from its fundamental value. Contrarian investors benefit from this shock as long14
as informed value traders react by pushing the price back towards the fundamental value.15
Testing the added value of active strategies is no easy task. Such testing is indeed plagued
by a very serious issue: data mining. When thousands of researchers and practitioners test16
thousands of trading strategies on the same time series, the null hypothesis of no abnormal17
profit is indeed very likely to be rejected at a given level of confidence because of pure luck only.18
Basic procedures of statistical hypothesis testing on single time series could therefore lead to19
wrong statistical decisions. We therefore apply the Superior Predictive Ability (SPA) test and20
its stepwise extension (SSPA) that correct for the presence of data snooping bias and control21
for the luck factor. These methods are more powerful than traditional bootstrap approaches.22
We construct contrarian strategies based on predetermined daily market variations (from ±1%23
to ±10%). We also use various percentiles in the tails of the return distribution and apply24
a 5-year rolling window to update the buy and sell signals. Two different cash management25
approaches are proposed and four different double-or-out options are introduced. Overall, we26
4After being wiped out in one of the many stock market crashes of his era, Isaac Newton already wrote in
1768: ‘I can calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies but not the movements of the stock market’.
12
test 200 contrarian strategies for each underlying asset. The dataset includes 10 different stock1
indexes (including emerging markets) and three exchange rates.2
After adjusting for data-snooping bias, only a few strategies beat the buy-and-hold bench-
mark strategy, which suggests that contrarian strategies are overall not successful. For some3
indexes (NIKKEI, EURO STOXX, FTSE, and DAX), there is nevertheless some evidence4
of predictability. The level of predictability is lower after the inclusion of transaction costs5
but the change remains limited, pointing to the failure of contrarian strategies to generate6
abnormal gross profits.7
Foolish are the conservatives who still defend the idea that markets are always efficient.
Equally devoid of any good sense are the behavioral fundamentalists who claim that mar-8
kets are sufficiently inefficient to design robust, long-lasting, and profitable actively-managed9
strategies. Such is the main conclusion of this empirical study.10
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